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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION: PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE IN-SERVICE OBJECTOR
I

INTRODUCTION

Dating back to the colonial days, and continuing to the present,
statutory provisions have existed recognizing the status of conscientious
objectors.' Despite a consistent national policy of exempting conscientious
objectors from the demands of the draft,2 similar recognition has not always
been afforded to those who become conscientious objectors after entering
service in the armed forces.3 It is clear that the statute which provides for
exemption from induction to those who are classified as conscientious
objectors 4 was not meant to apply to personnel already in the armed
forces.15 As a result, until 1962 there were no procedures giving recognition
to the in-service objector.6 However, in that year the Secretary of Defense,
pursuant to statutory authority, 7 issued Department of Defense Directive
1800.6 (August 21, 1962),8 which provided for discharge of servicemen
who qualified as conscientious objectors. This article will examine the
nature and extent of the procedures which govern the discharge of the
in-service objector, not only to acquaint the reader with a subject which
1. See Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1968). For a brief
review of the history concerning special treatment of conscientious objectors see
United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1966).
2. Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1968). See generally
Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1961 Term, 1965 RELIGION & THE PuBLIC
ORDER 3.

3. Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1968).
4. Selective Service Act of 1948 § 6 (j), ch. 625, 62 Stat. 612 (1948), as amended
50 U.S.C. APP. § 456 0) (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1972) provides that if a
registrant is found by the local selective service board to be conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of religious training and
belief, he shall, in lieu of induction, be ordered to perform civilian work which
contributes to the maintenance of the national health, safety or interest.
5. Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1968); Crane v. Hedrick,
284 F. Supp. 250, 254 (N.D. Cal. 1968); Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686,
691 (D.N.J.), affd 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1005 (1968).
6. Before 1962 it was sometimes possible for an in-service objector to get a
discharge from the armed services, but the discharge would be couched in such
terms as inadaptability or lack of ability for military service instead of for reasons
of conscientious objection. Whether such a discharge would be granted to the objector, however, was largely dependent upon the individual's commanding officer.
In some cases commanders were willing to grant such discharges, while in others
they were not. In most cases the decision of the commanding officer was upheld.
See M. SIBLEY & P. JACOB, CONSCRIPTION OF CONSCIENCE 106

(1952).

7. Armed Forces Act, 10 U.S.C. § 133 (b) (1970) provides:
The Secretary [of Defense] is the principal assistant to the President in
all matters relating to the Department of Defense. Subject to the direction of the President and to this title and section 401 of title 50, he has
authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense.
8. This Directive has continued in existence with revisions since its inception
in 1962. A major revision occurred in 1968 and, more recently, in the promulgation of the present Department of Defense Directive 1300.6 (Aug. 20, 1971) [hereinafter cited as D.O.D. DiaRcrivE 1300.6]. This Directive and all implementing
regulations by the various services are found in 1 SSLR 2325 and following.
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has in recent years assumed increasing importance, but also to determine
the adequacy and fairness of these procedures.
II.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DrxR'vE

1300.6

AND IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS

A. Nature and Scope of Coverage
The present Department of Defense Directive 1300.6 [hereinafter
referred to as Directive 1300.6 or Directive] governs all members of the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and all reserve components of
these services. 9 Pursuant to this Directive each service has promulgated its
own regulations to implement its provisions. 1° It should be noted that
although the Directive and the implementing regulations are not of
statutory origin, as is the provision exempting conscientious objectors
from induction,11 they are just as binding,12 and give recognition to the fact
that this nation has historically respected valid conscientious objection. 13
Furthermore, failure to have procedures which extend the benefit of
section 6 () of the Military Selective Service Act of 19671 4 to servicemen
who become conscientious objectors after entry into the armed forces would
appear to create a substantial equal protection problem. 5
9. D.O.D. DmECrVE 1300.6, § I.

10. Each of the military services has had implementing regulations in effect
following the issuance of Directive 1300.6 in 1962, with changes being made as
necessary. Due to the recent revision of the Directive, the services have also had to
revise their regulations governing the disposition of conscientious objectors. The
following regulations are presently in effect:
Aimy: ARmy REGULATION (AR) 635-20 (July 31, 1970), as revised Oct. 18,
1971. AR 635-20 applies equally to commissioned officers, warrant officers, and

enlisted personnel (volunteers and inductees). The procedures governing disposition of conscientious objectors in the Army National Guard and Army Reserve
are found in AR 135-25 (Sept. 2, 1970), as revised Oct. 18, 1971.
NAvy: BuRAru OF NAvAL PERSONNEL NOTICE (BUPERSNOTE) 1900 (Oct.
1971), effective Oct. 20, 1971 (cancelled July 1972 but treated as effective until
replaced). This notice updates Navy procedures formerly contained in Bureau of
Naval Personnel Manual (BUPERSMAN) 1860120. This regulation applies to
active and reserve members of the Navy.
Am FoRcE: Ant FoRcE REGULATION (AFR) 35-24 (Oct. 18, 1971). This regulation superseded AFR 35-24 (May 1, 1970), and applies to all personnel in the Air
Force and Air Force Reserve.
MAm1NE Cops: MAamE Cops OanRa (MCO) 1306.16C (Nov. 19, 1971). This
order superseded MCO 1306.B, and applies to all personnel in the Marine Corps
and Marine Corps Reserve.
11. See note 4 supra.
12. In Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir. 1968), the court, in
reviewing an in-service conscientious objector claim, stated:
We recognize, of course, that on this appeal we are dealing with Department of Defense Regulations rather than a statute. We reach the same
result, however, because a validly promulgated regulation binds the government as much as the individuals subject to the regulation ....
13. Parisi v. Davidson, 92 S. Ct. 815, 822 (1972).
14. See note 4 supra.

15. See Hansen, Judicial Review of In-Service Conscientious Objector Claims,

17 U.C.LA. L. REv. 975 (1970). But see Brown v. McNamara, 263 F. Supp. 686,
691 (D.N.J., aff'd, 387 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), where the court (in dictum) indicated that the Secretary of Defense could, without violating any constitutional
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B. Submission and Review of Application
Any member of the armed services seeking discharge' 6 by reason of
conscientious objection must submit a written application. 17 The applicant

is then personally interviewed by a chaplain,' 8 examined by a psychiatrist, 19

and afforded the opportunity to appear before an investigating officer 20
in the grade of 0-321 or higher. The application, along with all supporting documents-which include the written results of the chaplain's inter-

view, the psychiatric evaluation, and the investigating officer's report-

is then forwarded through the applicant's chain of command. 22 Each
commander reviewing the application enters his recommendation of approval or disapproval and the reasons for his conclusion. The final decision
as to approval or disapproval is then made by the headquarters of the
military service concerned. 23 The services have established a Conscientious
rights, totally deny a procedure for dealing with in-service conscientious objector
claims.
16. Directive 1300.6 also governs servicemen seeking assignment to non-combatant duty by reason of conscientious objection. Servicemen who are classified
as non-combatants by the military correspond to the I-A-O classification of the
Selective Service System. This article is concerned only with those in-service objectors requesting discharge from the service based on their conscientious objection
to participation of any kind in war in any form, including non-combatant service.
Servicemen so classified by the military correspond to the 1-0 classification of the
Selective Service System.
17. The application is submitted to the immediate commanding officer of the
applicant. See AR 635-20, para. 4a (July 31, 1970). To a large extent the regulations of the various services are reproductions of the provisions contained in the
Directive, but in certain instances they are more detailed in order to implement
its broader provisions. When appropriate, reference will be made to these implementing regulations to illustrate how they effectuate the provisions of the Directive.
18. D.O.D. DnmErv 1300.6, § VI.C. Although it is not required either by
the Directive or implementing regulations, some military installations attempt to
afford those objectors whose beliefs are founded on traditional religious training
an interview with a chaplain who is of the same faith or denomination. After this
interview the chaplain must submit a written opinion as to the nature of the
applicant's beliefs, as well as to his sincerity and depth of conviction. He must indude reasons for his conclusion. Id.
19. The purpose of this psychiatric examination is to make certain the applicant is free from any psychiatric disorders warranting treatment or disposition
through medical channels. If a psychiatrist is not reasonably available the applicant
will be examined by a medical officer. See D.O.D. DrcriEw 1300.6, § VI.C.
20. Id. § VI.D. This officer must not be in the applicant's chain of command.
If the applicant is an officer, the investigating officer must be his senior in rank. Id.
21. Id. AFR 35-24, para. 10 (Oct. 18, 1971) requires the investigating officer
to be in the grade of 0-4 (Major) or higher, except for staff judge advocates, who
may be in the grade of 0-3 (Captain) or higher. The Navy also requires the investigating officer to be in the grade of 0-4 (Lieutenant Commander) or above.
The provision which requires the hearing to be conducted by an officer outside
the applicant's chain of command is in contrast to the 1962 Directive, which provided that the applicant's immediate commanding officer was to act as the hearing
officer. See United States ex rel. Mankiewicz v. Ray, 399 F.2d 900, 902 (2d Cir.
1968). In 16 AM. JUR. TRIALs Selective Service Litigation 326-27 (1969) it is stated
that in the larger military installations these hearing officers have been "fair-minded
men with none of the visceral resentment and distaste toward conscientious objectors often felt by commanding officers."
22. D.O.D. Dmnarnrv 1300.6, § VI.E.
23. Id. § VI.F.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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Objector Review Board (CORB)24 to review each application and to make
a recommendation to the appropriate decision-making authority concerning
the proper disposition of each application. The decision of the CORB
is ordinarily considered final but, in cases where a United States attorney
so requests, the decision-making authority can conduct a de novo review
of all prior proceedings. 25 After the final decision is made the applicant
is given written notification and, if found to be a conscientious objector,
will be discharged for the convenience of the government.26 If the decision
is adverse, however, reasons must be given to support such denial. 27 It
should be noted that an applicant may, in case an adverse decision is
rendered, seek further review in military channels by appealing to the
appropriate board for correction of military records.28 It appears, however, that because few applicants have had success in appealing to the
correction boards,2 9 and because federal courts do not require the appeal
as an exhaustion requirement, 0 few in-service objectors make such appeal
before resorting to the courts for judicial review.
24. The Army CORB is composed of a senior officer, an officer in the Judge
Advocate General Corps, a chaplain, and a Medical Corps officer. Only two
votes are required(1971).
to approve an application. See Ehlert v. United Sates, 402
U.S. 99, 107 n.11
25. See Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 250, 252 (9th Cir. 1971).
26. D.O.D. Dixcrniv 1300.6, § VII.A. Even if the military finds the inservice applicant to be a bona fide conscientious objector entitled to discharge, it
appears that such discharge prior to completion of an obligated term of service
is discretionary, and thus could be denied if not "consistent with the effectiveness
and efficiency of the Military Service," or not found to be "practicable and equitable." See D.O.D. Drn~c-E 1300.6, § IV.A. In Silberberg v. Willis, 420 F.2d 662,

666 (1st Cir. 1970), the court, in reviewing an in-service claim brought under the
similar provisions of Directive 1300.6 (May 10, 1968), stated that discharge was
to be granted in the absence of abnormal or extraordinary circumstances such as
military necessity. Since the inception of Directive 1300.6 in 1962 there appears to
have been no instance where an in-service applicant was found to be a bona fide
conscientious objector and then denied discharge on the grounds of military
"effectiveness," or because a discharge would not be "practicable and equitable."
The policy of the Department of Defense is to discharge those applicants who are
found to be genuine objectors. Needless to say, such a policy benefits the services
because the bona fide objector will likely remain true to his beliefs and, if not
discharged, will only hinder military effectiveness and efficiency.
27. D.O.D. Dnmaarv 1300.6, § VI.F.
28. These boards were established as the result of legislation by Congress in
1946 which authorized the secretaries of the various services, acting through boards
of civilian officers, to alter military records when necessary to prevent injustice.
As a result of this legislation each service has established a board for correction of
military records whose function is (when requested by a serviceman) to review his
records, and correct errors or remove injustice when found necessary. See Parisi v.
Davidson, 92 S. Ct. 815, 818 n.4 (1972).
29. Hansen, supra note 15, at 988 n.65.
30. See Pitcher v. Laird, 421 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel.
Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700, rehearing denied, 412 F.2d 1137 (4th Cir. 1969).
Although the Ninth Circuit, in Craycroft v. Ferrall, 408 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1969),
vacated, 397 U.S. 335 (1970), held that an appeal to the appropriate board for
correction of military records was an exhaustion requirement, it appears that this
position has now been abandoned. See Bratcher v. McNamara, 448 F.2d 222, 224
(9th Cir. 1971). In Packard v. Rollins, 307 F. Supp. 1388, 1392 (W.D. Mo. 1969),
aff'd, 422 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1970), the court held that appeal to the Army Board
for Correction of Military Records was not required in order for a serviceman to
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C. ProceduralRights Afforded the In-Service Objector
The directive in effect prior to the present Directive 1300.6 was subjected to criticism for its failure to provide the minimum requirements
of administrative due process to the in-service applicant. 3 ' It appears that
when the present Directive was revised it took into consideration many of
these previous criticisms, for the Directive now provides the necessary
procedural rights to an applicant while at the same time insuring that the
system is not abused by an insincere applicant who asserts a fraudulent
claim. These rights will now be examined.
It should be noted at the outset that a potential in-service objector,
as soon as he makes his objections known to responsible military officials,
has the right to be informed and advised concerning the submission of
his application for discharge as a conscientious objector.32 During the time
his application is being processed and until a final decision is made by
the appropriate authority, the applicant is to be assigned to duties which
will conflict as little as possible with his asserted beliefs.33 It should also
be noted that a serviceman who applies for discharge before being placed
on orders for reassignment will be retained at his old duty station pending
final decision on his application.3 4 However, if a serviceman makes such
application after being placed on orders he may be required to comply
with the orders and submit his application upon arrival at his new duty
station.35
Once the serviceman has supplied the minimum information required
for an application,30 he has the right to appear in person at a hearing
exhaust his administrative remedies. On appeal the government abandoned its
claim that such appeal was required. It appears the decision of the military is
"ripe" for judicial review after final decision is made by the Adjutant General of
the Army, the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, or the Adjutant General of
the Air Force. Both the Army and Air Force correction boards will accept jurisdiction to review the caims of in-service objectors, but such a procedure is not insisted upon by the government as a precondition for judicial review. It appears the
Naval Board for Correction of Military Records rejects review of these claims for
want of jurisdiction. U.S. DEP'T Or JUSTICE, MxarO. NO. 652, at 2 (Oct. 23, 1969).
31. In Brahms, They Step to a Different Drummer: A Critical Analysis of the
Vis-A-Vis
In-Service
Department
of Defense
Current47
10,
1300.6 (May ObDirectiveConscientious
criticized
the author
1 (1970), Position
Mit. L. Ray.
jectors,
1968) for its failure to provide adequate provisions regarding
evidentiary standards,
documentary evidence
presentation of
right to cross-examination and
thewitnesses,
decision
be informed of or
that the claimant
as well as for its failure to require
reached at each level of consideration and the basis or reasons for such decision.
See also Ward, In-Service Conscientious Objectors: Suggested Revisions in Present
Procedures of Processing, 25 JAG J. 113 (1971).
32. Epstein v. Commanding Officer, 327 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
33. D.O.D. Diexa= 1300.6, § VI.H. It has been this author's experience to
find that many commanding officers in the Army today appear to be sincere
and cooperative in their efforts to assign conscientious objector applicants to
duties which provide minimum conflict with their beliefs. In many instances commanders who have doubts will seek legal advice from the local staff judge advocate
as to the propriety of a proposed duty assignment.
34. See M.C.O. 1306.16C, para. 7 m (Nov. 19, 1971).
35. D.O.D. Dmicvx 1300.6, § VI.H.
36. Id. enclosure 1. This minimum required information includes general information concerning the applicant, a description of his training and beliefs
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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conducted by an investigating officer.37 The hearing in informal in nature
but all oral testimony is under oath or affirmation.38 The purpose of the
hearing is
[t]o afford the applicant an opportunity to present any evidence
he desires in support of his application; to enable the investigating
officer to ascertain and assemble all relevant facts; to create a
comprehensive record; and to facilitate an informed recommendation by the investigating officer and an informed decision on the
merits by higher authority.3 9
It is not mandatory that the applicant appear before the investigating
officer, but if he does fail to appear he is deemed to have waived his
40
appearance and the investigating officer may proceed in his absence.
If the applicant does appear but refuses or fails to submit to questioning under oath or affirmation, this fact may properly be considered by
the investigating officer in making his decision and recommendation on
the applicant's claim.41 The applicant is afforded the right to have counsel
present to represent him at the hearing and to assist him in the presentation of his case. 42 This right to have counsel present during the hearing
is one of vital importance to the applicant, not only because the hearing
is in the nature of a cross-examination by the investigating officer, 43 but
also because the applicant is subordinate in rank.4 4 Although the applicant
does not have the right to subpoena witnesses, the local commander is
required to render all reasonable assistance in order to make military
members requested by the applicant available as witnesses. 45 Also, the
applicant is afforded the opportunity to present witnesses on his behalf,
as well as the right to cross-examine any witnesses who appear.4 6
Although a verbatim record of the hearing is not required, an applicant who desires it has the right to have a verbatim record made at his
own expense.4 7 In absence of such a choice, the investigating officer will
and participation in military and religious organizatons, and letters of references
which the applicant desires to be considered.
37. Id. § VI.D.2.
38. Id. § VI.D.2.b. This hearing is not governed by the rules of evidence in
courts-martial and any relevant evidence may be received. Id.
39. D.O.D. Dnmuc
1300.6, § D.2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. § D.2.a. The applicant must bear this expense himself, however. It is
interesting to note that a Selective Service registrant, when appearing before his
local board to present his conscientious objector claim, has no right to have
counsel present. It has been said that thousands of draft registrants have been
denied due process of law as a result of erroneous action by local boards which
has gone unchecked because of this lack of assistance of counsel. 117 CONG. REC.
S14,222 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1971).
43. In Champ v. Seamans, 330 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (M.D. Ala. 1971), the
court stated that the proper purpose of the hearing is to cross-examine the applicant and, where legitimately suspicious circumstances are found, to pursue
them to a proper determination.
44. See note 20 supra.
45. D.O.D. Dnutcrnv 1300.6, § D.2.c.
46. Id.
47. Id. § D.2.d.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/5
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summarize the testimony of witnesses and give the applicant and his counsel

the opportunity to examine the summary and note their differences for
the record.48 The applicant is entitled to receive a copy of the record 49
at the time it is forwarded through the chain of command for review and,
if the record is adverse, is notified of his right to submit a rebuttal to the
investigating officer's report. 50 Upon review by the headquarters of the
military service concerned, any additional information (other than the
applicant's official service record) which is considered and which the
applicant has not had the opportunity to rebut or comment upon is made
a part of the record-with the applicant afforded the opportunity to rebut

or comment upon it before a final decision is reached. 51

Finally, the in-service objector who has applied for and been denied
discharge as a conscientious objector is given the right to submit subsequent applications. 52 Before such an application will be processed

and forwarded for review, however, it must appear that it is not based
on essentially the same grounds as the previous application. 53 This provision apparently recognizes that bases and beliefs underlying and supporting conscientious objection claims can change significantly over a period
of time through the influences of such factors as "reading, dialogue with
others, continued introspection, and the influences of life's experiences." 54
As a result, a claim that was at one time properly diagnosed as insincere
could later develop into a sincere and genuine claim because of subsequent influences upon the applicant. 55
D. Establishing a Prima Facie Case

In order to qualify for discharge as a conscientious objector it is neces-

sary that the applicant first establish a prima facie case.5 6 To establish a
prima facie case, the applicant must show: (1) that he is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form;5 T (2) that his opposition
48. Id. One criticism of the previous Directives was that they did not require any record of the hearing to be kept. See Ward, supra note 31, at 116.
49. The record consists of the investigating officer's report, the serviceman's
written application, the report of the interview with the chaplain, the psychiatrists
evaluation, evidence received as a result of the hearing, and any other items
submitted by the applicant in support of his claim. D.O.D. DiMrrvE 1300.6, §
VI.D..f.
50. Id.
51. Id. § VI.F.
52. Id. § V.G.
53. Id. The decision whether or not a second or subsequent application is
based upon essentially the same grounds or supported by essentially the same
evidence is usually made by the installation commander's designated official. If
the application is found to be essentially the same it is returned to the applicant
without action. If not essentially the same, the application will be processed in
accordance wih the procedures followed in the first application-including an
interview with a new chaplain, psychiatrist, and investigating officer.
54. Morrison v. Larsen, 446 F.2d 250, 254-55 (9th Cir. 1971).
55. Id. at 255.
56. Peckat v. Lutz, 451 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1971).
57. D.O.D. DircrrvE 1300.6, §§ V.A.I., V.D. (1). Section V.B.I. interprets
the clause "war in any form" as follows:
[A]n individual who desires to choose the war in which he will participate is not a conscientious objector under the law. His objection must be
to all wars rather than a specific war.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
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is by reason of "religious training and belief'; 58 and (3) that his belief
is sincere and deeply held. 59 It should be noted that the requirements for
establishing a prima fade case by the in-service objector under Directive
1300.6 are the same as for the Selective Service registrant seeking exemption from the draft as a conscientious objector.60 Furthermore, the judicial
precedents involving claims to exemption from induction are applicable
to those already in the service seeking discharge for like reasons. 61 Directive
1300.6 has incorporated in its definition of "religious training and belief" 62
the decisions in both United States v. Seeger68 and United States v. Welsh.64
Furthermore, in defining "war in any form"' 65 the Directive incorporates
Gillette v. United States,6 6 which established the requirement that a conscientious objector be opposed to all war and not to a select or single war.
However, a belief by the applicant in a theocratic war does not come within

58. Id. § V.A.2. Section II_.B. sets forth an eleborate definition of "religious training and belief":
Belief in an external power or being or deeply held moral or ethical belief,
to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimately dependent, and which has the power or force to affect moral well-being. The
external power or being need not be of an orthodox deity, but may be a
sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor
a place parallel to that filled by the God of another, or, in the case of
deeply held moral or ethical beliefs, a belief held with the strength and
devotion of traditional religious conviction. The term "religious training
and belief" may include solely moral or ethical beliefs even though the
applicant himself may not characterize these beliefs as "religious" in the
traditional sense, or may expressly characterize them as not religious.
The term "religious training and belief' does not include a belief which
rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, expediency, or
political view.
59. Id. § V.A.3. Section V.C.2. provides:
Great care must be exercised in seeking to determine whether asserted
beliefs are honestly and genuinely held. Sincerity is determined by an impartial evaluation of the applicant's thinking and living in its totality,
past and present .... Information presented by the claimant should be
sufficient to convince that the claimant's personal history reveals views and
actions stiong enough to demonstrate that expediency or avoidance of
military service is not the basis of his claim.
60. See Clay v. United States, 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971).
61. United States ex rel. Sheldon v. O'Malley, 420 F.2d 1344, 1348 (D.C. Cir.
1969). See also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 442 (1971).
62. See note 58 supra.
63. 380 U.S. 163 (1965). This case stands for the proposition that exemption
on religious grounds is not limited merely to those who hold an orthodox belief
in God but includes as well a sincere and meaningful belief that "occupies a
place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in
God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption." Id. at 165-66.
64. 398 U.S. 333 (1970). In Welsh the Court enunciated a broad test for
conscientious objection, which includes "those whose consciences, spurred by
,deeply held moral, ethical or religious beliefs, would give them no rest or peace
if they allowed themselves to become a part of an instrument of war." Id. at 344
(emphasis added). For a discussion of Welsh, see Davis, Conscientious Objection
on "Deeply Held" Moral and Ethical Grounds, 36 Mo. L. Ray. 256 (1971).
65. See note 57 supra.
66. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/5

8

Ross: Ross: Conscientious
Objection
MISSOURI
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

the definition of "war in any form" and thus does not preclude an applicant
from being classified as a conscientious objector.6 7

E. Grounds for Denial of Conscientious Objection Claims
1. Waiver and Res Judicata
An in-service applicant can of course be denied his request for discharge as a conscientious objector if he fails to establish a prima fade case
as required by Directive 1300.6.68 Furthermore, a serviceman can establish
by clear and convincing evidence the necessary elements of a prima fade
case and still find himself ineligible for classification as a conscientious
objector and subsequent discharge. Directive 1800.6 specifically recognizes
two grounds for such a denial of eligibility, both of which concern servicemen who possessed conscientious objector beliefs before entering military
service. The first ground is based on the theory of waiver. Under this theory
if the applicant's beliefs were such that he satisfied the requirements for
classification as a conscientious objector under the Selective Service Act,
and he failed to request such classification from the Selective Service
System before entering the military, he is deemed to have waived his conscientious objection claim, and is thus ineligible for discharge from the
military based on such objection. 69
The second ground is based on the concept of res judicata. This theory
involves individuals who sought conscientious objector classification with
the Selective Service System before entering the military, and had their
requests denied on the merits. If such an individual's later request for
discharge as a conscientious objector is "based upon essentially the same
ground, or supported by essentially the same evidence, as the request which
was denied by the Selective Service System," 70 he is likewise ineligible for
discharge. In essence, the military defers to the judgment of the Selective
67. D.O.D. DimrrvE 1300.6 § V.B.2. provides that "a belief in a theocratic
or spiritual war between the powers of good and evil does not constitute a willingness to participate in 'war' within the meaning of this Directive." This provision is apparently based on the authority of such decisions as Sicurella v. United
States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955) and Kretchet v. United States, 284 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.
1960). It should be noted that the mere fact an applicant is willing to use force
in the defense of himself and his family does not mean that he is not opposed
to war in any form. Thomas v. Salatich, 328 F. Supp. 18 (E.D. La. 1971). Uncertainty by the applicant as to how much force he would be willing to use in selfdefense will also not derogate from his claim to universal objection to war. Solomen
v. Seamans, 331 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Mass. 1971).
68. D.O.D. Dimcrivn 1800.6, §§ V.A., D. Thus, if the evidence disclosed that
his conscientious objection to war was limited only to the war in Vietnam or that
his objection actually stemmed from political considerations and not from "religious training and belief," either ground would be a proper reason to deny the
claim. Davenport v. Laird, 440 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1971).-But if the reason for
denying the claim is based on the fact that the applicant's beliefs rest upon political views, it must appear that his views rest so~l l upon such political considerations. Packard v. Rollins, 422 F.2d 525, 527 (8th Cir. 1970). The fact that the
applicant has political objections to a particular war does not prevent him from
being classified as a bona fide conscientious objector so long as his objection is
also by reason of his "religious training and belief." Browning v. Laird, 323
F. Supp. 661, 665 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
69. D.O.D. DmerrW 1300.6, § IV.A.L. (a).
70. Id. § IV.A.L (b).
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Service, which has already considered the same claim on the merits. However, the determination as to whether the in-service claim is essentially
the same as the pre-service request must be made by the military.7 1
It is important to note that special recognition has been given to
conscientious objectors whose beliefs crystallized or became fixed after
receipt of induction notice from the Selective Service but prior to induction.
If an individual could not, under Selective Service regulations, seek classification as a conscientious objector with the Selective Service System, then
he may, after induction, submit his claim and have it considered on the
merits by the military. 72 This provision apparently was included in Directive 1300.6 as a result of Ehlert v. United States.73 In that case the government assured the Supreme Court that individuals whose beliefs became
fixed or crystallized after receipt of induction notice but before induction
would have a forum available in the military in which to secure a review
of their claim on the merits.7 4 This procedure, which requires the Ehlert
objector to submit his claim in the military after induction instead of to
the Selective Service before induction, does place a burden on the military.
The military is required to expend time and money in feeding, clothing,
and training individuals in this category while their claims are being
processed through military channels. In many cases these individuals will
be found to be bona fide conscientious objectors and will be discharged.
Not only is such a procedure wasteful but the presence of conscientious
objectors in training units is detrimental to military discipline and effidency.7 5
2. Insincerity
Sincerity of belief is a fundamental requirement for an in-service ap71. In Slaughter v. Birdsong, No. 6335 (M.D. Tenn., Nov. 22, 1971), the
court reviewed a military determination which had found the applicant's in-service
request to be essentially the same as his pre-service request denied by the Selective Service System. The court disagreed with the military determination, holding
that the applicant's claim that he had had a religious experience in the military
and had decided to become a priest made his request essentially a different one.
1300.6, § IVA.
72. D.O.D. DREcY
73. 402 U.S. 99 (1971). In Ehlert, the claimant asserted that his conscientious objector beliefs became fixed subsequent to reciept of induction notice
and before induction into the military. Under the Selective Service regulations the
local board could not entertain his claim at this late stage (after induction notice
had been sent), and military procedures then in effect apparently excluded review
of requests based on beliefs which were fixed before induction. Thus Ehlert was
in a "no-mans" land without a forum in which he could assert his claim.
74. Id. at 107.
75. In his dissenting opinion in Ehlert, Justice Douglas stated why he felt
pre-induction review was better:
Moreover, proof of a conscientious objector's claim will usually be much
more difficult after induction than before. Military exigencies may take
him far from his neighborhood, the only place where he can find the
friends and associates who know him. His chance of having a fair hearing
are therefore lessened when the hearing on the claim is relegated to inservice procedures. For these reasons I would resolve any ambiguities in
the law in favor of pre-induction review of his claim and not relegate him
to the regime where military philosophy, rather than the First Amendment, is supreme.
Id. at 113 (dissenting opinion of Douglas, J.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/5
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plicant to be granted conscientious objector status. 78 Even though an applicant establishes a prima fade case and appears to qualify for discharge,
the military may determine that he is not sincere in his beliefs and deny
his daim77 The military officials who are of primary importance in making this determination of sincerity are the investigating officer and the
chaplain. Both of these officials are required to make a special finding on
the issue of the applicant's sincerity, including the reasons for their conclusions.78 Great weight is given to these determinations because they are
made on the basis of a personal interview with the serviceman. 9 It appears that the finding of insincerity is seldom based on actual demeanor
evidence or objective contradictory evidence. Rather, it is more often based
upon conjecture that the applicant is asserting his claim to avoid unpleasant duty.8 0 The courts have held that mere speculation as to the ap-

plicant's insincerity is not sufficient grounds for denial of his claim.8 ' In-

stead, such a determination of insincerity must be based on provable and
reliable facts. 8 2 Therefore, a conscientious objector review board, in examining an application, is not at liberty merely to disbelieve the applicant.8 3 The following are grounds which courts have held insufficient
to establish insincerity: (1) the fact that the serviceman did not submit his
claim until being confronted with the prospect of service in Vietnam;8 4
(2) the fact that the applicant had abandoned his faith during college
when at the time of his application he held different religious beliefs;8 5
and (3) the fact that the applicant did not attend church frequently when
he claimed his beliefs grew out of his own personal Bible study and not
from any church affiliation.8 6
On the other hand, grounds apparently sufficient to establish insincerity are: (1) the fact that the applicant submitted his claim sub76. Kaye v. Laird, 442 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
77. Lovallo v. Resor, 443 F.2d 1262, 1264 (2d Cir. 1971); Hansen, Judicial
Review of In-Service Conscientious Objector Claims, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 975, 998
(1970).
78. D.O.D. Dia~crrv 1300.6, §§ VI.C., VI.3.d.
79. Rastin v. Laird, 445 F.2d 645, 649 (9th Cir. 1971).
80. Hansen, supra note 77, at 998. It appears that a disproportionate number
of conscientious objector claims are asserted shortly before departure for Vietnam.
Such applications cannot avoid creating suspicions as to the applicant's sincerity.
Cusick, In-Service Conscientious Objection: Problems of the Growing Privilege,
25 JAG J. 35, 38 (1970). However, as will be noted later, the courts look upon
such impending service as a catalyst for crystallization of beliefs and thus the mere
timing of the claim is not of itself enough to deny an otherwise valid claim.
81. See Bates v. Commander, 413 F.2d 475 (1st Cir. 1969).
82. Helwick v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 1971).
83. Id.
84. See Bortree v. Resor, 445 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States ex -el.
Tobias v. Laird, 413 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1969); Alley v. Ryan, 319 F. Supp. 981
(E.D.N.C. 1970); Ross v. McLaughlin, 308 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D. Vir. 1970). In
Rothfuss v. Resor, 443 F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1971), the court held that although
'timing of an application which comes on the eve of deployment is a fact which
casts doubt on the sincerity and veracity of an applicant, this fact alone, without
other support in the record, was insufficient to warrant denial of the application.
85. See Alley v. Ryan, 319 F. Supp. 981 (E.D.N.C. 1970).
86. See Peckat v. Lutz, 451 F.2d 366 (4th Cir. 1971).
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sequent to receiving orders for Vietnam when coupled -ith other facts;8 7
(2) the demeanor of the applicant;88 and (3) the fact that the applicant
stated his beliefs in a way which dearly indicated he was not familiar with
them8 9 or that they were merely reproductions of the statements of others. 90
III. JUDiciAL RFvIEw OF MILTARY CONscImNTIOus
OBJEcroR DETERMINATONS

It appears that the great majority of applications for discharge from
the service based on conscientious objection are denied by the military.91
However, merely because the military has denied his request does not
mean a serviceman will be unsuccessful in his quest for a conscientious objector discharge. It is dear that the in-service objector whose claim has
been denied by the military may seek judicial review by petitioning for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. 92 The scope of review followed by the federal courts in such cases is the "basis in fact" test established for review of Selective Service dassifications.93 Thus, if the applicant
has established a prima fade case, and the court can find no "basis in
fact" to support the denial of the request, the court will grant the writ of
habeas corpus and order the military service concerned to discharge the
87. See Frey v. Larsen, 448 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1971) (other facts: applicant's
inconsistent statements); Cohen v. Laird, 439 F.2d 866, 868 (4th Cir. 1971) (other
facts: applicants claim consisted largely of reproductions of statements of others).
88. See Frey v. Larsen, 448 F.2d 811, 813 n.3 (9th Cir. 1971).
89. In Bortree v. Resor, 445 F.2d 776, 783-84 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court (in
dictum) stated that although an inference of insincerity could logically be drawn
from the fact that a conscientious objector applicant expressed his beliefs in a
manner which indicated that he was not familiar with them, the military must
be careful in drawing such an inference due to the fact that many sincere applicants
use language which they have gotten from their spiritual advisors and their own
study, thus tending to give the impression that their thoughts are not their own.
90. See Cohen v. Laird, 439 F.2d 866, 868 (4th Cir. 1971). But see Champ v.
Seamans, 330 F. Supp. 1127, 1132 (M.D. Ala. 1971), where the court held that the
mere fact an applicant copies material from a book is not enough to establish
insincerity since the use of the best words he can find does not detract from his
sincerity.
91. For the six-year period beginning in 1962 and ending in 1968, Army
statistics showed that out of some 804 conscientious objector applications reviewed
only 145 were approved. The Navy approved a somewhat higher rate, and the
Air Force a considerably higher rate. See Sherman, judicial Review of Military
Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 48 Mm. L. REV.
91, 117 n.131 (1970).
92. See United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700 (4th Cir.
1969); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). Such review is not to be
stayed by the court where the in-service objector has court-martial action pending
against him as a result of his conscientious objection. Parisi v. Davidson, 92 S. Ct.
815 1972).
93. The "basis in fact' test was apparently established in Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), and reaffirmed in conscientious objector cases in
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). It has subsequently been applied
by the courts in reviewing in-service conscientious objector claims. See Helwick
v. Laird, 438 F.2d 959, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1971); Hammond v. Lenfest, 398 F.2d
705, 716 (2d Cir. 1968). This test is said to be the "narrowest known to the law."
Negre v. Larsen, 418 F.2d 908, 909 (9th Cir. 1969), affd sub nom. Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
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serviceman.0 4 This illustrates the importance of the requirement that the
military give reasons for its conclusion in each case, and that such reasons
be based on facts contained in the record. A mere decision without supporting reasons based on facts in the record will not amount to a "basis
in fact" so as to uphold a military determination. 95
IV.

CONCLUSION

The procedures adopted by the Department of Defense and the implementing regulations of the various services are adequate to give procedural protection to the in-service objector. Directive 1300.6 has incorporated the major decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the
subject of conscientious objection. This has modernized military procedures,
and has helped military personnel responsible for handling conscientious
objector claims to become more knowledgeable on a subject previously
misunderstood by many. Perhaps the most important reform contained in
the Directive and the one most needed by the services is the provision
dealing with the responsibilities of the investigating officer and the conduct
of the hearing and preparation of the record. These procedures are not
only designed to provide safeguards for the applicant but also to help
detect those servicemen who only seek such classification in order to
avoid further military service. One apparent weakness in these procedures
lies in the fact that the hearing is not mandatory for the applicant. 96 It is
submitted, however, that few applicants will choose not to appear and
present their cases orally in light of the provision which permits the investigating officer to take into account the applicant's waiver of appearance

and his failure to submit to questioning under oath or affirmation. In
addition, the applicant is required to appear personally before the chaplain
and at that time his demeanor and credibility will be tested in a face-toface dialogue.
How much influence the courts have had upon the evolvement of
the present Directive is difficult to determine. It cannot be doubted that
judicial review of military determinations in habeas corpus proceedings,
through application of the "basis in fact" test, has had significant influence-in that it has caused the Department of Defense to re-examine
and update its procedures governing the in-service objector. Furthermore,
continued willingness by the courts to review military conscientious objector
determinations will tend to insure that pre-service and in-service objectors
are judged by the same standards.
Due to the relative ease with which a prima facie case for conscientious
objection can be enunciated by an applicant, it is essential for the governing procedures to insure that a thorough and adequate investigation of
each claim will be made and a complete and accurate record prepared. At
the same time these procedures must insure that the applicant will receive
a full and fair hearing. Directive 1300.6 accomplishes these objectives.
WENDELL

R.

GIDEON

94. See, e.g., Frisby v. Larsen, 330 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United
States ex rel. Confield v. Tillson, 312 F. Supp. 831, 834 (S.D. Ga. 1970).
95. See Bortree v. Resor, 445 F.2d 776, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
96. The previous Directive 1300.6 (May 10, 1968) was criticized for the
same reason. See Ward, In-Service Conscientious Objectors: Suggested Revisions in
Present Procedures of Processing, 25 JAG J. 113, 116 (1971).
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IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESS IN MISSOURI
I.

INTRODUCTION: NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

Witnesses, being human, sometimes fail to perform on the stand as
well as the parties who put them there might hope. Generally, a witness
may disappoint the party calling him in one of two ways: (1) he may fail
to testify to facts to which the calling party had expected he would testify,
or (2) he may testify to facts positively favorable to the adverse party.'
The purpose of this comment is to examine, under present Missouri law
and particularly in view of the rule against impeaching one's own witness,
what remedies are available in various situations to the party disappointed
by the testimony of his own witness and, further, to examine how the
law in this area might be changed so that the goal of our system of litigation-the ascertainment of the truth-might be more closely approached.
II.

THE RULE AGAINST IMPEACHING ONE'S OWN WITNESS

The rule that looms largest to the litigant disappointed by his witness
is the familiar one that prohibits impeachment of one's own witness.
Scholars have advanced theories as to the likely origins of this ancient
rule,2 but whatever its beginnings the rule against impeaching one's
own witness is very much with us today in Missouri. In order to understand the rule, three questions must be asked and, hopefully, answered.
First, what are the theoretical justifications for the rule and what is the
validity of each? Second, what witnesses are a party's own for purposes
of the application of the rule? Finally, what is "impeachment" for purposes of the rule's application?
A. Theoretical Justifications for the Rule and
Criticisms of the Validity of Each
There are three more or less logical theories advanced today by those
attempting to justify the rule against impeaching one's own witness.3 A
fourth possible rationale supporting the rule, that a party is morally bound
by the testimony of a witness he produces, has been abandoned. 4
The theory most often cited by Missouri courts as the basis for the
rule is that a party by calling a witness vouches for his veracity and will
not be heard to question it. 5 The flaws in this rationale have been pointed
out so clearly by leading writers in the field that it is hard to believe that
it would have any currency were it not reinforced by centuries of repetition.
Except for character and expert witnesses, a party usually has no choice
1. State v. Bowen, 265 Mo. 279, 282, 172 S.W. 267, 268 (1915).
2. See 3 J. WIG-ojoE, EvmEN E § 896 (Sd ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
Wimiop]; Ladd, Impeaching One's Own Witness: New Developments, 4 U. CI.
L. REV. 69 (1936).
3. Ladd, supra note 2, at 76.
4. 3 WiGmoRE § 897.
5. State v. Hulbert, 299 Mo. 572, 575, 253 S.W. 764, 766 (1928); Dunn v.
Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597, 600 (1885); Detjen v. Moerschel Brewing Co., 157 Mo.
App. 614, 617, 138 S.W. 696, 697 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911); Joyce v. St. Louis Transit
Co., 111 Mo. App. 565, 568, 86 S.W. 469, 470 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905); Creighton
v. Modem Woodmen of America, 90 Mo. App. 378, 883 (K.C. Ct. App. 1901).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/5
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as to whom to call as a witness, but is limited to those who observed firsthand the event, transaction, or condition in question. 6 Thus, a party
cannot choose from among potential witnesses the most trustworthy, and
therefore he should not be charged with the consequences of having so
chosen. 7 Further, common experience tells us that persons are not divided
into two classes: the completely trustworthy and the completely untrustworthy. Therefore, it seems rather harsh to say that a party, by calling
a witness, represents him as reliable in all that he says. 8 Finally, it is
sometimes said that a party stands sponsor to his witness' testimony as a
result of the adversary system of litigation. In answer to this contention,
Professor Ladd points to the replacement of common law pleading by code
pleading as an instance of the relaxation of the strict adversary system of
litigation to fit modem trial realities, and suggests that a similar relaxation would be in order in the area of impeachment of a party's own
witness.8
The second theory advanced in support of the rule against impeaching one's own witness is that a party ought not to have the means of
coercing favorable testimony from his witness.1 0 This justification is recognized in at least two Missouri cases as the true reason for the rule,"' and
2
is recognized by Professor Wigmore as having at least some validity.'
Its validity is minimal, however. First, the threat of coercion is present
only with regard to certain forms of impeachment, i.e., impeachment by
evidence of bad character or of corruption, which involves exposing disgraceful conduct in open court.' 3 Even where the impeachment contemplated is of a type capable of being used to coerce, the witness probably
can be made to fear its use only in very limited circumstances.' 4 Finally,
even in situations in which the witness fears impeachment, and can be
controlled by the threat, the coercion theory is based on the false premise
that "all witnesses who give destructive testimony to the party who calls
them, are testifying to the truth."'1
The final justification advanced for the rule applies only to situations
involving impeachment by prior inconsistent statement. It is a general
rule of evidence in Missouri that a witness' prior inconsistent statements
are hearsay and therefore incompetent as substantive evidence; they are
admitted only because of their relevance to the witness' credibility.'8 Given
6. C. McCoR:crK, LAw OF EvMENCE § 38 (1954); Ladd, supra note 2, at 77.
7. 3 WiGiroia § 898; Ladd, supra note 2, at 77; May, Some Rules of Evidence,
11 Am. L. Rrv. 264 (1877).
8. 3 WMORE § 898.
9. Ladd, supra note 2, at 79-80.
10. C. McCouncg, supra note 6, at 70; 3 WiGMORE § 899; Ladd, supra note
2, at 80-81.
11. State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Mo. 1963); Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo.
628, 646-47, 173 S.W.2d 851, 858-59 (1943).
12. 3 WimGoRE § 899.
13. Id.
14. Id.; Ladd, supra note 2, at 82, 85.
15. Ladd, supra note 2, at 85.
16. E.g., State v. Gordon, 391 S.W.2d 346, 349 (Mo. 1965); Foster v. Aines
Farm Dairy Co., 263 S.W.2d 421, 427 (Mo. 1953); State v. Pflugradt, 463 S.W.2d
566, 571 (K.C. Mo. App. 1971); C. McGonicx, supra note 6, at 73; 3 WMoRE

§ 1018.
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this restriction, and the policies behind it, a party can have no legitimate
reason for wanting to prove his own witness' prior inconsistent statements
unless he is harmed and entrapped. 17 If a party is not harmed by the testimony, he has no interest in causing the jury to disbelieve it. If a party is
harmed by his witness' testimony, but he called the witness expecting his
testimony to be harmful, the only logical explanation of such a course of
action would be that the party intended to prove his witness' prior favorable statements, ostensibly for impeachment purposes, hut actually in the
hope that the jury would consider them as substantive evidence. Therefore, absent an entrapment of the party calling the witness, the rule
against impeaching one's own witness serves to prevent a party from taking
undue advantage of the courts' willingness to admit, for impeachment
purposes, evidence of the prior inconsistent statements of a witness.1 8
It is submitted, then, that of the three possible rationales here considered, only the last justifies retention of the rule against impeaching
one's own witness. The vouching concept is based on an outmoded view
of the nature of the trial. The threat of coercion operates only in extremely
limited circumstances. However, the rule ,serves a valid and practical
purpose insofar as it prevents a party, who has not been entrapped, from
offering the favorable prior inconsistent statements of his witness, not so
much for impeachment purposes, as to tempt the jury to use them as
substantive evidence.
B. Who Is One's Own Witness?
Obviously, before the rule prohibiting a party from impeaching his
own witness can apply it must be determined that the person on the stand
is the party's own witness. Questions in this area arise most frequently in
three contexts: (1) What is the first point in time during the dealings
with a witness at which the witness becomes one's own? (2) What are
the consequences (with regard to making a witness one's own) of going
beyond the scope of the direct examination in the cross-examination of a
witness? And (8) whose witness is one who has been called by both parties?
In Missouri, a party by making a witness his own at one trial does
not make the witness his own at a later trial, even though the parties
and the subject matter are identical in both trials.' 9
The Missouri Supreme Court has identified clearly those acts which
will or will not suffice to make a person whom a litigant has put on the
stand the witness of that litigant:
Nor does one make a witness his own within the rule limiting
the right of impeachment by summoning the witness; nor by
17. See pt. III, § A of this comment for a discussion of the elements of entrapment.
18. State v. Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. 1970); State v. Kinne, 372
S.W.2d 62, 67 (Mo. 1963); State v. Bowen, 263 Mo. 279, 283, 172 S.W. 367, 369
(1915); State v. Burks, 132 Mo. 363, 371, 34 S.W. 48, 49 (1896); Hughes v. Patriotic
Ins. Co., 193 S.W.2d 958, 959 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946); In re Largue's Estate, 198
Mo. App. 261, 273, 200 S.W. 83, 86 (St. L. Ct. App. 1918); McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TExAs L. REv. 573,
587 (1947).
19. State v. Hulbert, 299 Mo. 572, 575, 253 S.W. 764, 766 (1923).
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simply putting him on the witness stand and causing him to be
sworn; nor by only asking him immaterial questions when put
on the stand. The test as to whether a witness is one's own or not,
so as to limit the right of cross-examination for the purpose of
impeachment, is, was he called and examined upon a material issue
by the party seeking to impeach him .... 20
Missouri also takes the generally accepted position 2l that
the introduction of a deposition or a part thereof by a party for any
purpose other than that of contradicting or impeaching the
deponent makes the deponent the22 witness of the party, unless
the deponent is the adverse party.
Thus, a party does not make a person his witness merely by taking his
deposition.2 3 Nor, where one party introduces only part of a deposition
and the adverse party introduces other relevant testimony from the deposition, does the adverse party thereby make the deponent his witness.2 4
A problem arises with regard to the rule against impeaching one's
own witness in the situation where one party calls and examines a witness
and then the other party does not confine his cross-examination to matters
brought out on direct examination.2 5 This raises the issue of whether
by going beyond the scope of direct examination the cross-examining party
has made the witness his own and, if so, what are the consequences.
In jurisdictions following the so-called federal rule, which limits
cross-examination to matters within the scope of direct examination, it is
often held that where a cross-examining party violates the limited crossexamination rule he thereby makes the witness his own.2 6 Wigmore criticizes this position, pointing out that the limited cross-examination rule
serves merely to regulate the order of proof and bears no relation to the
justifications stated for invoking the rule against impeaching one's own
witness.27
In those jurisdictions such as Missouri2 8 which allow cross-examination to go beyond the scope of direct examination, some courts have held
that by going beyond the scope of direct examination the cross-examiner
20. Id. at 575, 253 S.W. at 766 (citations omitted).
21. C. McCoRAnmc, supra note 6, at 71; 3 WiGmomr § 912.
22. Conner v. Neiswender, 360 Mo. 1074, 1081, 232 S.W.2d 469, 473 (1950);
accord, Hayes v. Kansas City S. Ry., 260 S.W.2d 491 (Mo. 1953); Gosney v. May
Lumber & Coal Co., 352 Mo. 693, 179 S.W.2d 51 (1944); Black v. Epstein, 221
Mo. 286, 120 S.W. 754 (1909); Edwards v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 137 S.W.2d
591 (St. L. Mo. App. 1940); Woelfie v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo.
App. 135, 112 S.W.2d 865 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938); State ex rel. Wilkinson v.
Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 282 Mo. App. 748, 112 S.W.2d 607 (K.C. Ct. App.
1937); In re Largue's Estate, 198 Mo. App. 261, 200 S.W. 83 (St. L. Ct. App. 1918).
23. King v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 195 Mo. 290, 310, 92 S.W. 892, 898 (1906);
Gilchrist v. Stark, 41 S.W.2d 888, 893 (K.C. Mo. App. 1931).
24. Conner v. Neiswender, 360 Mo. 1074, 1081, 232 S.W.2d 469, 478 (1950).
25. See 3 WIGOORE § 914.
26. Id. at 427 & n.1; e.g., Zumwalt v. Gardner, 160 F.2d 298, 802 (8th Cir.
1947).
27. 3 WzGmom § 914.

28. § 491.070, RSMo 1969.
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makes the witness his own. 29 Wigmore is even more critical of this application of the rule, pointing out that it cannot even be justified, as it
might be in a "federal" rule jurisdiction, as a sanction for violating the
"federal" limited cross-examination rule.3 0 Unfortunately, this appears
to be the law in Missouri, at least to the extent that a cross-examiner who
goes beyond the scope of direct examination thereby makes the witness
his own and may not thereafter impeach him.3 '
When a party has made a witness his own by cross-examining him
on subjects not covered in the original proponent's direct examination,
the question arises whether the original proponent may thereafter impeach
the witness. Although the original proponent in this situation may examine
the witness in the manner of cross-examination as to new subject matter
brought out in his opponent's cross-examination,3 2 he may not impeach
the witness by introducing extrinsic evidence of the witness' prior incon33
sistent statements nor of his unfavorable reputation for truth and veracity.
When both parties to a suit call a witness, the questions arise (1)
whether the party subsequently calling the witness thus makes him his
own, and (2) if so, whether the witness thereafter ceases to be the witness
of the party originally calling him.3 4 The party subsequently calling the
witness can examine him in the manner of cross-examination even if such

29. 3 WiGMoRm § 914, at 427 & n.2.

30. Id. § 914.

31. Ayers v. Wabash R.R., 190 Mo. 228, 236, 88 S.W. 608, 609 (1905) (dictum);
Anderson v. Union Terminal R.R., 161 Mo. 411, 421, 61 S.W. 874, 877 (1900);
Reding v. Reding, 143 Mo. App. 659, 673, 127 S.W. 936, 940 (Spr. Ct. App.
1910) (semble); King v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 101 Mo. App. 163, 172, 76 S.W. 55, 58

(St. L. Ct. App. 1903).
The question whether a party makes a witness his own by cross-examining
beyond the scope of direct examination is considered here only for purposes of
the rule against impeaching one's own witness. The same question may come up
in other contexts, i.e., in determining whether a party has waived the incompetency
of a witness (Nichols v. Nichols, 147 Mo. 387, 403, 48 S.W. 947, 951 (1898); Hume
v. Hopkins, 140 Mo. 65, 75, 41 S.W. 784, 786 (1897)) or whether a party is somehow "bound" by the testimony of a witness (Greffet v. Dowdall, 17 Mo. App. 280,
281 (St. L. Ct. App. 1885). See note 52 infra.
It is submitted that the reasons behind the rule against impeaching one's
own witness bear no necessary relationship to the questions of waiver of incompetency or whether one is "bound" by his witness, and therefore that determination of who is one's witness for purposes of the impeachment rule should be
made only in view of the various rationales for the impeachment rule, and not
by analogy to the other questions, as is sometimes done. See Ayers v. Wabash R.R.,
190 Mo. 228, 236, 88 S.W. 608, 609 (1905); King v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 101 Mo.
App. 163, 172, 76 S.W. 55, 58 (St. L. CL App. 1903).
32. State ex rel. Hospes v. Branch, 151 Mo. 622, 639, 52 S.W. 390, 396 (En
Banc 1899); Neuhoff Bros. Packers v. Kansas City Dressed Beef Co., 340 S.W.2d
193, 196 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960).
33. Vernon v. Rife, 294 S.W. 747, 749 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927) (dictum);
Creighton v. Modem Woodmen of America, 90 Mo. App. 378, 385 (K.C. CL App.
1901); but see Neuhoff Bros. Packers v. Kansas City Dressed Beef Co., 340 S.W.2d
193, 196 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960) (stating that as to testimony given on crossexamination the witness becomes the cross-examiner's, and is subject to crossexamination and impeachment by the original proponent).
34. 3 Wnmaoam §§ 911, 913.
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examination damages the witness' credibility. 5 Further, in Hutchinson
v. Richmond Safety Gate Co.,3 6 where defendant called and examined Pletz
as part of its case in chief and plaintiff called Pletz in rebuttal, it was
held not to be error to allow plaintiff to impeach Pletz with extrinsic
evidence of his prior inconsistent statements because "whenever a party
to a suit introduces a witness in a cause, he is, under the laws of this State,
37
the witness of that party for all purposes throughout the case."
The question whether, in the situation where both parties call a
witness, the party originally calling the witness may impeach him after
the other party has called him has apparently never been decided in
Missouri. However, in view of the language quoted from the Hutchinson
case 38 and by analogy to the scope of cross-examination cases, 39 it would
seem that the party who first called the witness could not later seek to
impeach him.
C. What Is "Impeachment" for Purposes of the Rule?
Assuming that a party has made a witness his own, the question then
becomes: What sort of evidence is excluded by the rule against impeaching one's own witness? The rule dearly prohibits a party from presenting
certain types of evidence because of its adverse effect on the witness' credibility, but it does not exclude all types of evidence which might be said
to damage the credibility of the witness.
It is certain in Missouri that the rule means at least that a party
cannot prove the bad moral character of his witness 40 or, subject to exceptions, 41 that his witness has made out-of-court statements contradictory of
42
his testimony.
While impeachment by evidence of bias, interest or corruption is not
mentioned in the usual Missouri formulation of the rule against impeaching one's own witness,48 such impeachment apparently is forbidden by
the rule. Two cases tend to confuse the area. In State v.Duestrow, 44 the
prosecution was held to have been properly allowed to ask leading questions of its recalcitrant witness, notwithstanding the fact that the questions
tended to show the bias of the witness in favor of defendant, which may
35. Luzzadder v. McCall, 198 S.W. 1144, 1145 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917); State
v. Jones, 64 Mo. 391, 397 (1877).
36. 247 Mo. 71, 152 S.W. 52 (1912).
37. Id. at 104, 152 S.W. at 62.
38. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
39. See cases cited and text accompanying note 33 supra.
40. While the only Missouri case involving attempted impeachment by proof
of bad moral character dealt exclusively with evidence of bad reputation for truth
and veracity (City of Gallatin ex rel. Dixon v. Murphy, 217 S.W.2d 400 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1949)) and the rule is sometimes stated only in terms of reputation for truth
an veracity (see, e.g., Joyce v. St. Louis Transit Co., 111 Mo. App. 565, 86 S.W.
469 (St. L. Ct App. 1905)), evidence of the prior convictions of one's own witness
arguably would also be excluded by the rule. See 3 WiGMORE § 900, at 390 g-n.1.
41. See pt. III, § A of this comment.
42. E.g., Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 285, 94 S.W. 876, 882
(1906); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597, 600 (1885); Luzzadder v. McCall, 198 S.W.
1144, 1145 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917).
43. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
44. 137 Mo. 44, 38 S.W. 554 (1897).
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have tended to impeach the witness. According to the Missouri Supreme
Court, "[c]ourts should not be averse to letting in the light of day on
such reprehensible transactions." 4 5 Duestrow may be explained, however,
as a situation fitting the "entrapment" exception 46 to the general rule
against impeaching one's own witness, rather than as one to which the
general rule does not apply, because the court noted that it was manifest
that the prosecution had been surprised or misled. 47 A similar situation
existed in Humes v. Salerno,48 where it was held that the trial court had
not abused its discretion by allowing plaintiff to examine his witness
concerning certain gestures made by defendant to the witness while the
latter was testifying and to inquire into a conversation between defendant
and the witness immediately before the witness took the stand. Such
examination was allowed because plaintiff's counsel had been "surprised"
or "shocked" by the witness' change in testimony after receiving defendant's
hand signals. 49 Other Missouri cases dearly hold that
a party cannot put a witness on the stand, and ask him questions
showing that he had been guilty of some improper conduct, without showing surprise or entrapment, for this would violate the wellknown rule that a party may not impeach his own witness .... 50
Thus it seems that-notwithstanding the contrary suggestions in Duestrow
and Humes-the rule against impeaching one's own witness generally forbids inquiry into the bias, interest, or corruption of one's own witness.
Missouri courts, along with the vast majority in other jurisdictions, 51
hold that, although a party supposedly vouches for his witness' veracity, he
is not "bound" by his witness' testimony in that he is not precluded from
proving by other witnesses that the facts are different from those to which
his witness testified. Thus, "[i]f A. put B. on the stand, and prove by him
a certain state of facts, this does not preclude A. from putting C., D., or E.
on the stand, and proving a different state of facts ....,52 It is dear that,
when A by C, D, and E proves the fact to be different than as stated by
B, there is distinct damage to B's credibility both as to the testimony which
45. Id. at 85, 38 S.W. at 565.
46. See pt. III, § A of this comment.
47. 137 Mo. at 85, 38 S.W. at 565.
48. 351 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. 1961).
49. Id. at 754.
50. Gallagher v. S. Z. Schutte Lumber Co., 273 S.W. 213, 220-21 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1925); accord, Conner v. Neiswender, 360 Mo. 1074, 1081-82, 232 S.W.2d 469,
473 (1950); Baker v. Metropolitan St. Ry., 181 Mo. App. 392, 393, 168 S.W. 842,
843 (K.C. Ct. App. 1914).
51. 3 WiGmoRm § 907, at 417 & n.7.
52. Rodan v. St. Louis Transit Co., 207 Mo. 392, 408, 105 S.W. 1061, 1066
(1907); accord, State v. Shapiro, 216 Mo. 359, 115 S.W. 1022 (1909); Brown v.
Wood, 19 Mo. 475 (1854); Martin v. Manzella, 298 S.W.2d 453 (St. L. Mo. App.
1957); Krause v. Laverne Park Ass'n, 240 S.W.2d 724 (St. L. Mo. App. 1951);
Vanausdol v. Bank of Odessa, 222 Mo. App. 91, 5 S.W.2d 109 (K.C. Ct. App. 1928).
It is often stated that for purposes of ruling on a motion for directed verdict
a party is "bound" by the testimony of his witnesses. This means that where a
witness called by a party gives testimony on a certain point, in the absence of other
evidence on that point tending toward a different conclusion, the party will not
be allowed to invite the trier of fact to disregard his witness' testimony by asking
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol37/iss3/5
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was directly contradicted as well as to the remainder of his testimonym3
However, casting doubt on the veracity of a witness' testimony in this
manner is not proscribed by the rule that one may not impeach his own
witness. 54
While a party generally cannot prove his witness' prior inconsistent
statement by extrinsic evidence, he may use the prior inconsistent statement to cross-examine the witness, even though such cross-examination may
damage the credibility of the witness.5 5 This matter is treated in some
detail later in this comment. 56
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE AGAINST IMPEACHING ONE'S OwiN WITNESS

Given the questionable soundness of the various rationales for the rule
against impeaching one's own witness, 57 the courts have been willing to
find exceptions to its application in certain situations in which to apply
the rule would produce especially harsh results. Missouri courts recognize
two such exceptions: (1) where a party has been entrapped into calling
the witness, 58 and (2) where the witness is the adverse party.59 The entrapment exception allows impeachment by evidence of the witness' prior
inconsistent statements,6 0 and by evidence of bias, interest, or corruption
as well. 61 The adverse party-witness exception applies only, at the present
62
time, to impeachment by evidence of prior inconsistent statements.
Neither exception allows a party to impeach his own witness by proof of
bad moral character. 68
A. The Entrapment Exception
Missouri joins the majority of jurisdictions6 4 in allowing a party "entrapped" into calling a witness to impeach the witness by extrinsic evidence
the trier to draw an inference contrary to the witness' testimony. E.g., Silberstein v.
Berwald, 460 S.W.2d 707, 710 (Mo. 1970); Campbell v. Fry, 439 S.W.2d 545, 549
(K.C. Mo. App. 1969). The concept of a party's being "bound" by his own witness
should not be confused with the problem of impeaching one's own witness.
53. 3 WIGMORE § 907; May, supra note 7, at 263.
54. Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097, 1101, 88 S.W.2d 353, 355 (1935); Schumacher v. Kansas City Breweries Co., 247 Mo. 141, 155-56, 152 S.W. 13, 16
(1912); Black v. Epstein, 221 Mo. 286, 304, 120 S.W. 754, 760 (1909); Imhoff & Co.
v. McArthur, 146 Mo. 371, 377, 48 S.W. 456, 457 (1898); State v. Burks, 132 Mo.
363, 372, 34 S.W. 48, 49 (1896); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597, 601 (1885); Brown
v. Wood, 19 Mo. 475, 476 (1854); Detjen v. Moerschel Brewing Co., 157 Mo. App.
614, 618, 138 S.W. 696, 697 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911); Brosius v. Sunflower Lead &
Zinc Co., 149 Mo. App. 181, 186, 130 S.W. 134, 135 (Spr. CL App. 1910); Joyce
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 111 Mo. App. 565, 568-69, 86 S.W. 469, 470 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1905); Edwards v. Crenshaw, 30 Mo. App. 510, 515 (St. L. Ct. App. 1888);
Helling v. United Order of Honor, 29 Mo. App. 309, 317 (St. L. Ct. App. 1888).
55. See cases cited note 111 infra.
56. See pt. IV of this comment.
57. See pt. II, § A of this comment.
58. See cases cited note 65 infra.
59. See cases cited and text accompanying note 100 infra.
60. See cases cited note 65 infra.
61. See case cited and text accompanying note 50 supra.
62. See case cited and text accompanying note 100 infra.
63. Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 235, 94 S.W. 876, 882 (1906).
64. 3 WIGMolRE § 905, at 404 &n.4.
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of his prior inconsistent statements.6 5 Thus, it may become important for
the disappointed party armed with the prior statement of his witness to
determine what constitutes entrapment.
The situation in which entrapment is present is described generally
as one where
the witness, or the adverse party to the cause, has entrapped or
misled the party calling the witness by some artifice, so as to induce
him to call the witness, and thereby to gain an advantage in the
case over the party calling him which the adverse party would not
have had if he had called the witness. 66
One writer aptly describes such conduct as a "double-cross." 67 However, a
mere showing that he has been "double-crossed" or entrapped will not
suffice to enable a party to impeach his own witness under the entrapment exception. The party further must have been harmed by the witness'
testimony. 68
65. Randazzo v. United States, 300 F. 794 (8th Cir. 1924); State v. Kinne, 372
S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1963); State v. Turner, 272 S.W.2d 266 (Mo. 1954); State v.
Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1954); Malone v. Gardner, 362 Mo. 569, 242 S.W.2d
516 (1951); Conner v. Neiswender, 360 Mo. 1074, 232 S.W.2d 469 (1950); Mooney
v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 352 Mo. 245, 176 S.W.2d 605 (1944); Crabtree v. Kurn,
351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851 (1943); State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47
(1936); McDaniel v. Sprick, 297 Mo. 424, 249 S.W. 611 (1923); State v. Drummins,
274 Mo. 632, 204 S.W. 271 (1918); State v. Booth, 186 S.W. 1019 (Mo. 1916); State
v. Bowen, 263 Mo. 279, 172 S.W. 367 (1915); Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197
Mo. 215, 94 S.W. 876 (1906); Clancy v. St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 615, 91
S.W. 509 (1906); State v. Burks, 132 Mo. 363, 84 S.W. 48 (1896); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597 (1885); Meredith v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 257 S.W.2d 221 (St.
L. Mo. App. 1953); Hughes v. Patriotic Ins. Co. of America, 193 S.W.2d 958
(St. L. Mo. App. 1946); Dauber v. Josephson, 209 Mo. App. 531, 237 S.W. 149
(K.C. Ct. App. 1922); Deubler v. United Rys., 195 Mo. App. 658, 187 S.W. 813 (St.
L. Ct. App. 1916); Creighton v. Modern Woodmen of America, 90 Mo. App. 378
(K.C. Ct. App. 1901); Spurgin Grocer Co. v. Frick, 73 Mo. App. 128 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1898); State ex rel. Guthrie v. Martin, 52 Mo. App. 511 (St. L. Ct. App.

1893); Thomas, The Rule Against Impeaching One's Own Witness: A Reconsidera-

tion, 31 Mo. L. REv. 364, 368 (1966).
66. Clancy v. St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 615, 646, 91 S.W. 509, 519
(1906).
67. Thomas, supra note 65, at 369.
68. Malone v. Gardner, 362 Mo. 569, 582, 242 S.W.2d 516, 528 (1951);
Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628, 647, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); State v. Drummins,
274 Mo. 632, 647, 204 S.W. 271, 276 (1918); State v. Bowen, 263 Mo. 279, 282,
172 S.W. 367, 868 (1915); Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 235, 94
S.W. 876, 882 (1906); State v. Burks, 132 Mo. 363, 373, 34 S.W. 48, 50 (1896);
Meredith v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 257 S.W.2d 221, 227 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953);
Hughes v. Patriotic Ins. Co. of America, 193 S.W.2d 958, 959 (St. L. Mo. App.
1946); Dauber v. Josephson, 209 Mo. App. 531, 542, 237 S.W. 149, 153 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1922); Deubler v. United Rys., 195 Mo. App. 658, 669, 187 S.W. 813, 815
(St. L. Ct. App. 1916).
Technically, the fact of harm is a condition precedent to the permissibility
of attempting to show entrapment. See cases cited supra.
Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 236, 94 S.W. 876, 882 (1906), seems
to require an additional element of collusion between the witness and the adverse party, but none of the other above cited cases do and it is doubtful whether
it is a requirement.
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1. The Nature of Harm
A party is not harmed if his witness merely fails to relate on the stand
favorable facts which the party expected him to relate.6 9 Thus, there is
70
no harm where one's witness fails to testify because of a faulty memory,
2
1
claims his privilege against self-incrimination, or simply refuses to testify.
Nor is there any harm where the witness testifies, but the content of his
testimony is of no value to the party who called him. 3 For example, in
State v. Drummins,74 a prosecution for seduction under promise of marriage, the defendant was held not to have been harmed when his witness,
called to disprove prosecutrix' prior chaste character by testifying to specific
acts of intercourse with prosecutrix, testified that he had never had intercourse with the prosecutrix7 5
On the other hand, a party is harmed if his witness turns coat completely and by testifying to facts positively favorable to his opponents cause
"becomes in effect a witness for the adverse side." 76 State v. Booth,77 a
69. Randazzo v. United States, 300 F. 794, 797-98 (8th Cir. 1924); State v.
Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Mo. 1970); State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Mo.
1963); State v. Walker, 357 Mo. 394, 402, 208 S.W.2d 233, 237 (1948); State v.
Hogan, 352 Mo. 379, 383, 177 S.W.2d 465, 466 (1944); State v. Gregory, 339
Mo. 133, 147, 96 S.W.2d 47, 55 (1936); State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 647, 204
S.W. 271, 276 (1918); State v. Bowen, 263 Mo. 279, 282, 172 S.W. 367, 368 (1915);
Clancy v. St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 615, 649, 91 S.W. 509, 519 (1905); State v.
Burks, 132 Mo. 363, 373, 34 S.W. 48, 49 (1896); Hughes v. Patriotic Ins. Co. of
America, 193 S.W.2d 958, 959 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 148, 112 S.W.2d 865, 872 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
70. State v. Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Mo. 1970); State v. Bowen, 263
Mo. 279, 281, 172 S.W. 367, 368 (1915).
71. State v. Gordon, 391 S.W.2d 346, 348 (Mo. 1965).
72. State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 147, 96 S.W.2d 47, 55 (1936).
73. Randazzo v. United States, 300 F. 794, 797 (8th Cir. 1924); State v. Kinne,
372 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Mo. 1963); State v. Walker, 357 Mo. 394, 402, 208 S.W.2d 233,
237 (1948); State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 647, 204 S.W. 271, 276 (1918); State
v. Burks, 132 Mo. 363, 373, 34 S.W. 48, 49 (1896); Hughes v. Patriotic Ins. Co. of
America, 193 S.W.2d 958, 959 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946); Woelfie v. Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 148, 112 S.W.2d 865, 872 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
74. 274 Mo. 632, 204 S.W. 271 (1918).
75. Id. at 646-47, 204 S.W. at 276.
Drummins illustrates that "harm" does not describe accurately this element
of entrapment, but is used only as a convenient shorthand term. It would seem
that when in Drummins several of defendant's witnesses on the issue of prosecutrix' prior chaste character denied intercourse with prosecutrix, defendant's case
was "harmed," at least in the ordinary sense of the word. The courts, however,
focus not upon how harmful the witness' testimony is to his proponent, but

rather upon how favorable it is to the opponent. Thus, there was no "harm"
in Drummins because the testimony of defendant's witnesses that they had not

had intercourse with prosecutrix on certain specific occasions was not helpful to
the state on the issue of prior chaste character.
For other cases demonstrating that "harm" consists not of mere damage to
the proponent but rather of aid to the opponent, see State v. Walker, 357 Mo.
394, 208 S.W.2d 233 (1948); State v. Burks, 132 Mo. 363, 34 S.W. 48 (1896);
Hughes v. Patriotic Ins. Co. of America, 193 S.W.2d 958 (St. L. Mo. App. 1946).
76. State v. Drummins, 274 Mo. 632, 647, 204 S.W. 271, 276 (1918); accord,
State v. Booth, 186 S.W. 1019 (Mo. 1916); Deubler v. United Rys., 195 Mo. App.
658, 187 S.W. 813 (St. L. Ct. App. 1916); cases cited note 69 supra.
77. 186 S.W. 1019 (Mo. 1916).
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prosecution for obtaining money under false pretenses, provides an example
of such harm. Defendant, having pleaded the defense of insanity, put Quinn
on the stand with the apparent expectation that Quinn would testify
that defendant was "crazy" at the time he did the act complained of. Instead, Quinn swore that defendant was a "shrewd, cool, calculating
scoundrel . . ." who "had this whole thing worked out, planned, and

systematized .....

78 The court held that the testimony by Quinn was
positively favorable to the state so that an entrapment could be found.79
Harm may be found in more that the content of a witness' testimony.
In Deubler v. United Rys.,8o an action for damages for assault, defendant
called Scherzinger, who testified that plaintiff's reputation for peacefulness was "all right." Scherzinger's testimony was in itself harmful to defendant, but the appellate court noted further that defendant previously
had allowed otherwise inadmissible evidence of plaintiff's good character
to come in without objection, apparently in reliance that he would have
Scherzinger's testimony of plaintiff's reputation for violence to rebut
plaintiff's character evidence. Therefore, defendant was said to have been

harmed.81

2. The Nature of Entrapment
Generally, to establish entrapment a party must first show that he
was caused to put the witness on the stand by his justifiable reliance on
some conduct of the witness, the adverse party, or a third person.82 Then,
when the witness' testimony varies from that expected by the calling party,
there is entrapment.83 The Missouri courts appear to recognize at least

two broad categories of cases in which the calling party is justified in
expecting his witness' testimony to be favorable.

First, a litigant in carrying out his pre-trial discovery may become
convinced that a prospective witness' testimony will be favorable to his

cause. If the witness' testimony proves harmful, the litigant then must be
able to show that he has taken certain discovery steps for the purpose of

ascertaining what the witness' testimony would be before a court will find
justified reliance and therefore entrapment. It appears that the calling

party's reliance is not justified when he has only taken the witness' favorable written statement, at least when the statement was taken at a time
78. Id. at 1020.
79. Id. at 1021.
80. 195 Mo. App. 658, 187 S.W. 813 (St. L. Ct.App. 1916).
81. Id. at 667, 187 S.W. at 815.
82. Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628, 647, 173 S.W.2d 851, 859 (1943); Beier
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 235, 94 S.W. 876, 882 (1906); Clancy v. St.
Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 615, 646, 91 S.W. 509, 520 (1905); Feary v. O'Neill,
149 Mo. 467, 473, 50 S.W. 918, 919 (1899); Dunn v. Dunnaker, 87 Mo. 597, 601
(1885); Zips v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 169 S.W.2d 62, 69 (St. L.
Mo. App.), modified sub nom State ex rel. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n
v. Hughes, 351 Mo. 1081, 174 S.W.2d 859 (1943); Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 148, 112 S.W.2d 865, 872 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938);
Dauber v. Josephson, 209 Mo. App. 531, 542, 237 S.W. 149, 153 (K.C. Ct. App.
1922); Deubler v. United Rys., 195 Mo. App. 658, 669, 187 S.W. 813, 816 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1916); Spurgin Grocer Co. v. Frick, 73 Mo. App. 128, 133 (K.C. Ct. App.
1898); Thomas, supra note 65, at 369; Wallace, Direct Impeachment of an Adverse
Party, 35 Mo. L. REv. 271, 273 (1970).
83. See cases cited note 82 supra.
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remote from the time of trial 8 4 or when the statement is equivocal and
conflicts with other statements by the witness. 85 However, when the calling
party has obtained the witness' favorable statement immediately before
trial 0 or has taken a deposition of the witness which is consistent with
the witness' earlier favorable statements, 8 7 the courts have found the party's
reliance to be justified.
The second category is comprised of cases where the calling party expects favorable testimony as a result of his own pre-trial discovery, but in
addition the witness, the adverse party, or some other person has made
some affirmative gesture which causes the calling party to put the disappointing witness on the stand. Thus if the prospective witness, after making
a statement, expressly8 8 or impliedly8 9 assures the calling party that he will
testify in conformity therewith, there is entrapment if he fails so to testify.
The adverse party may also take a hand in perpetrating the entrapment.
In Clancy v. St. Louis Transit Co.,90 an action for damages for personal
injuries, the motorman on the streetcar which struck plaintiff had given
two statements and a deposition, all favorable to defendant. However,
unknown to the defendant, the motorman had also given plaintiff's counsel
a statement favoring plaintiff's cause. A change of venue was had from
St. Louis to Columbia, and the motorman went to Columbia for the trial
in the company of plaintiff, who paid the motorman's rail fare and hotel
bills. When defendant called and examined the motorman, his testimony
proved positively favorable to plaintiff. According to the court, "[n]o
stronger case of trick or artifice . . could be imagined than is presented
in this case." 9' 1
One situation in which it is clear that there can be no entrapment
is where a party makes a person his witness by introducing that person's
desposition into evidence. 02 The offering party may not argue that he
was entrapped by the testimony at the time the deposition was taken. The
relevant point in time at which to determine entrapment is when the
deposition is introduced.9 3 Further, there can be no entrapment at the
time a deposition is introduced into evidence because the offering party

84. See Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 94 S.W. 876 (1906) (statement made two years before trial); Dauber v. Josephson, 209 Mo. App. 531, 237
S.W. 149 (K.C. Ct. App. 1922) (testimony given at coroner's inquest held more

than one year before trial).

85. See Creighton v. Modern Woodmen of America, 90 Mo. App. 378 (K.C.

Ct. App. 1901).
86. Deubler v. United Rys.. 195 Mo. App. 658, 187 S.W. 813 (St. L. Ct. App.
1916) (statement made the day before trial).
87. Malone v. Gardner, 362 Mo. 569, 242 S.W.2d 516 (En Banc 1951).
88. See State v. Booth, 186 S.W. 1019 (Mo. 1916).
89. Crabtree v. Kurn, 351 Mo. 628, 173 S.W.2d 851

(1943)

(witness 11

months before trial gave deposition containing plaintiff-favoring statements,
signed the deposition the day before trial).
90. 192 Mo. 615, 91 S.W. 509 (1905).
91. Id. at 650, 91 S.W. at 520.
92. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
93. Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 150, 112
S.W.2d 865, 873 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
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will.have had -ample time and means to have apprised himself of -the import
of the deposition -testimony.&
B. The Adverse Party-Witness Exception
It s. particularly. indefensible to apply the- rule against impeaching
one's own witness to the situation where a litigant calls the adverse party
as his witness. 95 To say that a party, by placing his opponent on the stand,
represent him as reliable in all that he says "is to mock him with a false
formula." 96 It is.unlikely that a party could coerce his opponent into testifying falsely .against himself by the threat of impeachment. 97 Finally, there
is no. danger of getting inadmissible, hearsay before the jury98 in this
situation because a party's prior inconsistent statements generally come
in as admissions. 99 .
Accordingly, in 1969 in Wells v. Goforth,10 0 the Missouri Supreme
Court held that a party calling his opponent as a witness under the Missouri statute authorizing such a'procedureb1 may impeach his opponent
by proving his prior inconsistent statements. The court specifically repudia.ted dictum to the contrary inChandler v. Fleeman,10 2 which Missouri
cases had'been following. 108
Because the prior inconsistent statements of a party are usually admissible as admissions, the Wells adverse party-witness exception to the impeachment rule is of limited practical significance.10 4 Wells seems to indicate, however, an impatience'on the part of the Missouri courts with
the rule against impeaching one's own witness and a possible willingiess
to re-examine 'critically the propriety of applying the rule in situations in
which its invalidity is especially evident.10 5
IV." CROSS-EXAMINING ONE'S OWN WrrNEss
A. Use of the Witness' PriorInconsistent Statement
to Refresh Recollection and to-Awaken Conscience
In',Missouri, the party wvhbqjs disappointed with the testimony of his
94. Hayes v. Kansas City S. Ry., 260 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Mo. 1953); Conner v.
Neiswender, '360- Mo. 1074, 1081, 232 S.W.2d 469, 473 (1950); Gosney v. May
Lumber & Coal Co., 852. Mo. 693, 697, 179 S.W.2d 51, 53 (1944); Woelfle v.
Connecticut. Mut..Life- Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 118. 112 S.W.2d 865, 872 (St.
L. Ct. App. '1938); State ex rel. Wilkinson v. Central Surety & Ins. Corp., 232 Mo.
App. 748; 752, 112 S.W.2d 607, 610 (K.C. Ct. App.. 1937); In re Largue's Estate,
198 Mo. App. 261, 273, 200 ,S.W.83, 86 (St. L. Ct. App.. 1918).
95. See .3WIGMORE § 916,
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id.

98. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
99. C.'McCoRNI~c; LAW OF EVIDENcE 74 -(1954).
100.- -443 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Mo. En Banc 1969), noted in Wallace, supra note 82.
101. §,491.030, RSMo 1969.,
102 50Mo.239; 240 (1872).
103. See Wallace, supra note 82, at 271 8:cases cited n.3.
104. Wallace, =upra note 82, at.274, 275.
.105. Wells v. Gofortlh, 443 S.W.2d 155, 159-60 (Mo. En Banc 1969). See also
Luzzadder v. McCall,- 198 S.W. 1144, 1145 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917), where the court
says-in dictum that the rule against impeaching one's own witness does not apply
to a witness put on the stand to prove his own fraud because a party cannot
be-held to have vouched the veracity. of such a witness.
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witness' 0 but who may not impeach the witness1 07 may still have a remedy

for his disappointment. It is sometimes stated that a party may not impeach or cross-examine his own witness, 108 thus implying that both prohibitions apply in identical situations. However, Missouri courts have made
it clear that the allowability of cross-examination of one's own witness is
subject to a different standard than that of impeaching one's own witness. Thus,

[tlhe cross-examination of one's own witness for the purpose of
refreshing his recollection, or even for the purpose of laying the
foundation for a proper claim of surprise, is quite a different matter than the introduction of his prior contradictory extrajudicial
statements in evidence. The one is proper within reasonable
limits and subject to the sound discretion of the trial court, but
the other is permitted only when those circumstances of surprise,
entrapment, and prejudice exist which serve to take the case from
rule which prohibits the
within the application of the general
impeachment of one's own witness. 109
Particularly, a party may cross-examine* his own witness (subject to restrictions imposed in criminal cases to protect the accused's right to confrontation)" 0 by using the prior inconsistent statement of the witness

"for the purpose of probing his recollection, recalling to his mind statements he has previously made, and drawing out an explanation of his
apparent inconsistency.""' The discretion of the trial court in allowing
such cross-examination will not be questioned on appeal if it appears that

the witness' variance from his prior statement was unexpected by his
proponent,

12

or that the witness demonstrated forgetfulness,"s unwilling-

106. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
107. See pt. III of this comment.
108. State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372, 875 (Mo. 1954); Mooney v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n, 352 Mo. 245, 260, 176 S.W.2d 605, 611 (1944).
109. Woelfle v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 234 Mo. App. 135, 152, 112
S.W.2d 865, 874 (St. L. Ct. App. 1938).
110. See pt. IV, § B of this comment.
111. Creighton v. Modern Woodmen of America, 90 Mo. App. 378, 384 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1901); accord, Brown v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 315 Mo. 409, 419, 286
S.W. 45, 50 (1926); Beier v. St. Louis Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 234-35, 94 S.W.
876, 882 (1906); Coats v. Old, 237 Mo. App. 353, 369, 167 S.W.2d 652, 655 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1942); Dixon v. Western Tablet & Ticket Co., 246 S.W. 619, 621 (K.C.
Mo. App. 1922); Detjen v. Moerschel Brewing Co., 157 Mo. App. 614, 617-18, 138
S.W. 696, 697 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911); Ashby v. Elsberry & N.H. Gravel Road Co.,
111 Mo. App. 79, 83, 85 S.W. 957, 958 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
The Missouri courts recognize that this practice may well damage a witness'
credibility, but hold that this does not forbid its use by the witness' proponent.
Brown v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 315 Mo. 409, 419, 286 S.W. 45, 50 (1926); Hinds
v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 85 S.W.2d 165, 172 (St. L. Mo. App. 1935); Detjen v.
Moerschel Brewing Co., 157 Mo. App. 614, 618, 138 S.W. 696, 697 (K.C. Ct. App.
1911); Creighton v. Modern Woodmen of America, 90 Mo. App. 378, 384 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1901).
112. State v. McKinney, 475 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. 1971); Beier v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 197 Mo. 215, 234-35. 94 S.W. 876, 882 (1906); Luzzadder v. McCall,
198 S.W. 1144, 1145 (K.C. Mo. App. 1917); Detjen v. Moerschel Brewing Go., 157
Mo. App. 614, 618, 138 S.W. 696, 697 (K.C. Ct. App. 1911); Creighton V. Modem
Woodmen of America, 90 Mo. App. 378, 385 (K.C. Ct. App. 1901).
113. Coats v. Old, 237 Mo. App. 353, 359, 167 S.W.2d 652, 655 (K.C. Ct.
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ness, 1n 4 hostility," 5 or an interest adverse to that -of his proponent. 1 6
The courts are especially willing to allow the direct examiner to crossexamine a hostile or adverse witness that the party was compelled by the

circumstances to call." 7

.B. Restrictions on the Use of Prior Inconsistent
Statements to Cross-Examine in Criminal Cases
The practice of using the prior inconsistent statements of one's own
witness to refresh recollection and to awaken conscience is susceptible to
abuse as a vehicle for causing the jury to hear the witness' prior statements in hope that the jury will use the statements improperly as substantive evidence." 8 In Missouri, for the jury in a criminal case to consider
a wi tness' .prior statements as substantive evidence not only violates the
hearsay rule but also violates the confrontation clauses"19 of the federal
and state constitutions.120 Therefore, in 1914 in State v. Patton,'2 ' the Missouri Supreme Court held that, absent entrapment, 22 it was a denial of
the accused's right to confront the witnesses against him for the state to
identify a writing containing the prior statement of its witness as a true
copy of the witness' statement and then to read or give the writing to the
jury or to read it in the jury's presence.
In Patton, the court carefully prescribed the procedure to be followed
App. 1942); Ashby v. Ellsberry ScN.H. Gravel Road Co., 111 Mo. App. 79, 83, 85
S.W..957, 958 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
114. State v. McKinney, 475 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. 1971); Bingaman v. Hannah,
270 Mo. 611, 628, 194 S.W. 276, 281 (1917); Stevenson v. A.B.C. Fireproof Warehouse Co., 6 S.W.2d 676, 678 (K.C. Mo. App. 1928); Ashby v. Ellsberry 8c N.H.
Gravel Road Co., 111 Mo. App. -79, 83, 85 S.W. 957, 958 (St. L. Ct. App. 1905).
1 115. Mooney v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 352 Mo. 245, 260, 176 S.W.2d 605, 611
(1944); Monsour v. Excelsior Tobacco Co., 144 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Mo. 1940); Schipper
v. Brashear Truck Co., 132 S.W.2d 993, 999. (Mo. 1939); Tiede v. Fuhr, 195 S.W.
1008, 1009 (Mo. 1917); Bingaman v. Hannah, 270 Mo. 611, 628, 194 S.W. 276,
281 (1917); Stevenson v. A.B.C. Fireproof Warehouse Co., 6 S.W.2d 676, 678
<K.C. -Mo. App. .1928); Semper v. American Press, 217 Mo. App. 55, 76, 273 S.W.
186, 191 (K.C. Ct. App. 1925).
116. Schipper v. Brashear Truck Co., 132 S.W.2d 993, 999 (Mo. 1939); Burnam
v. Chicago G.W.R.R., 340 Mo. 25, 42, 100 S.W.2d 858, 867 (1936); Vernon v.
Rife, 294 S.W. 747, 749 (St. L. Mo. App. 1927).
117. State v. Castino, 264 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Mo. 1954); Mooney v. Terminal
R.R. Ass'n, 352 Mo. 245, 260, 176 S.W.2d 605, 611 (1944).
118. See State v. Gordon, 391 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. 1965); State v. Gregory, 339
Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47 (1936); State v. Patton, 255 Mo. 245, 164 S.W. 223 (1914);
Vest v. S.S. Kresge.Co., 213 S.W. 165 (K.C. Mo. App. 1919).
119. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Mo. CoNsr. art. 1, § 18 (a).

120. State v. Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Mo. 1970); State v. Gordon, 391
S.W.2d 346, 349 (Mo. 1965); State v. Randolph, 39 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Mo. 1931);
State v. Patton, 255 Mo. 245, 254, 164 S.W. 223, 225 (1914).
. 121. 255 Mo. 245, 254, 164 S.W. 223, 225 (1914). Cases reiterating or giving
further support to the Patton principle include State v. Harvey, 449 S.W.2d 649
(Mo. 1970); State v. Gordon, 391 S.W.2d 346 (Mo. 1965); State v. Kinne, 372
S.W.2d 62 (Mo. 1963); State v. Gregory, 339 Mo. 133, 96 S.W.2d 47 (1936); State
v. Randolph, 39 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. 1931); State v. Henson, 290 Mo. 238, 234
S.W. 832 (1921); State v. DePriest, 283 Mo. 459, 232 S.W. 83 (1921).
122. See pt. III, § A of this comment.
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by the state in using the prior -statement of its own witness to refresh :his
recollection or to awaken his conscience:
[T]he state ... may ask the witness, in order to refresh his memory,
if he did not testify before the grand jury, and may exhibit the
paper (without reading it, and without corporeally offering to
the jury the paper, or the contents thereof) to the recalcitrant
witness, permit the witness, if he wish, to examine his testimony,
his signature, and other insignia of verity, for the purpose of
identifying the copy of the testimony as a true copy of what the
witness said. Then, when he has identified and examined his testimony, the question upon which he had deviated or was doubifiil,
before he refreshed his memory, may aain be asked the witness.
If necessary to prevent the contents of the paper shown to the"
witness from getting to the jury, the latter may be withdrawn while
the witness is examining and identifying his testimony .... [I f
the witness deny his statements or refuse to identify the paper as
a copy of what he said before the grand jury, the state is con-

cluded .... 123
However, where the trial court allows the state to ask its witness about
his prior statements in the presence of the jury and the witness adopts his
12
prior statement as his trial testimony, prejudicial error is not committed. 4
1 25
may obviate the objection based on federal
Further, California v. Green
constitutional grounds to allowing the prosecution to examine its own
witness as to his prior inconsistent statements within the hearing of the
jury. Green involved the admission of the prior inconsistent statements of
a state's witness in a criminal prosecution, under a state law provision that
allowed the prior inconsistent statements of a witness subject to cross.
examination to be admitted as substantive evidence. 128 The Supreme
Court held that the admission of such evidence does not violate the confrontation clause 12 7 of the Constitution.1 28 It might be argued, then, that
if it does not offend the confrontation clause for the jury to use a witness'
prior statement as substantive evidence, the danger that the jury will so
use the statements is an insufficient ground for prohibiting the state from
questioning its witness about his prior statements in the jury's presence.
V.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM CREATED BY THE

RULE AGAINST IMPEACHING ONE'S OwN WITNEss

Writers and commentators who have considered the problem created
by the rule against impeaching one's own witness have advanced various
proposals for its solution, most of which involve doing away with the

123. State v. Patton, 255 Mo. 245, 257-58, 164 S.W. 225, 226 (1914).
124. State v. Tate, 468 S.W.2d 646, 649 (Mo. 1971) (semble); State v. Harvey,
449 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Mo. 1970); State v. Davis, 400 S.W.2d 141, 147 (Mo.), cert,
denied, 385 U.S. 872 (1966).
125. 399 U.S. 1'19 (1970).
126. CAL. Evi. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
127. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
128. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167-68 (1970).
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rule.'2 9 Professor Ladd, for example, recommends the following simple
piece of curative legislation: "No party shall be precluded from impeach130
ing a witness because the witness is his own."'
However, in view of the validity of the rule as a device for preventing
a litigant from using too freely the prior inconsistent statements of his
131
witness where such statements are inadmissible as substantive evidence,
it would seem that the rule should be eliminated only in conjunction with
a measure allowing the admission as substantive evidence of the prior
32
inconsistent statements of a witness available for full cross-examination.
With the hearsay problem thus obviated, the rule against impeaching one's
own witness would have little theoretical basis' 33 and would remain only
as a source of inconvenience to the trial lawyer.
At least one situation exists in Missouri in which the rule against
impeaching one's own witness might well be repudiated by judicial action.
The Missouri courts have deemed "prior inconsistent sworn statements
made by a witness in a deposition in the same case, and used to impeach
his testimony at the trial . . . ." sufficiently reliable for the trier of fact
to consider as substantive evidence of their contents. 34 There is, therefore,
no substantial reason for using the rule against impeaching one's own
witness to prevent a litigant from introducing into evidence such statements from his witness' deposition. The Missouri courts have said that a
party does not vouch for the witness by calling him. 135 The possibility of
coercion of the witness is extremely slight.13 6 The artificial restraints imposed by the rule against impeaching one's own witness upon the introduction of reliable evidence in this situation should be removed.
In the long run, however, the Missouri courts should not limit their
rejection of the rule against impeaching one's own witness to the above

129. See, e.g., Ladd, Impeaching One's Own Witness: New Developments, 4 U.
REv. 69, 96 (1936); May, Some Rules of Evidence, II Am. L. REv. 264, 270
(1877); Moidel, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 24 J. Am. JUD. SoC'Y 85, 87 (1940).
130. Ladd, supra note 129, at 96.
131. See cases cited and text accompanying note 18 supra.
132. For examples of such statutory provisions dealing with the rule against
impeaching one's own witness and prior inconsistent statements, see CAL. EVID.
CODE §§ 785, 1235 (West 1966); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENcE rules 106 (1), 503 (b)
(1942); PROP. FED. R. EVID. 607, 801 (d) (1) (i) (Rev. Draft 1971).
133. See pt. II, § A of this comment.
134. In Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400 (En Banc 1935),
CH. L.

the Missouri Supreme Court held that

prior inconsistent sworn statements made by a witness in a deposition in
the same case, and used to impeach his testimony at the trial. may be
accepted as substantive proof of the facts stated . .

..

Id. at 320, 85

S.W.2d at 411.
Accord, Ridenour v. Duncan, 291 S.W.2d 900 (Mo. 1956); Snowwhite v. Metro-

politan Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 705, 127 S.W.2d 718 (1939); Tate v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 339 Mo. 262, 96 S.W.2d 364 (1936); Stottlemyre v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 358
S.W.2d 437 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962); Blanks v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 342 S.W.2d

272 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961).

135. See State v. Kinne, 372 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Mo. 1963); Crabtree v. Kurn, 351

Mo. 628, 646-47, 173 S.W.2d 851, 858-59 (1943) (repudiating the vouching concept
and recognizing the coercion theory as the true reason for the rule).
136. See text accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
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situation, but should do away with it altogether. To accomplish this, it
is submitted that the soundest approach is the one taken by the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, i.e., one which makes a witness' prior inconsistent statements admissible as substantive evidence and abolishes the rule
against impeaching one's own witness. 137 In this manner a cumbersome,
outmoded concept would be made to give way to the realities of the modem
trial.
ScoTr W. Ross

137. See PRop. FED,. R. Evm. 801 (d) (1) (i), 607 (Rev. Draft 1971).
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